



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

APRIL, 1918

---

## VICTORY—PEACE—JUSTICE

### OUR FIRST YEAR IN THE GREAT WAR

*ANOTHER year!—another deadly blow!  
Another mighty Empire overthrown!  
And We are left, or shall be left, alone;  
The last that dare to struggle with the Foe.  
'Tis well! from this day forward we shall know  
That in ourselves our safety must be sought;  
That by our own right hands it must be wrought;  
That we must stand unpropped, or be laid low.*

No American poet, if one did live today, could say with truth as Wordsworth said of his countrymen a century ago, that "We are left, or shall be left, alone; the last that dare to struggle with the Foe"; never before, praise be to God, were England's hearts of oak less daunted or the souls of France more valiant. And yet, indeed, "'Tis well," if at last, as we stand upon the threshold of "another year," distressed if not dismayed by the spectacle of "Another mighty Empire overthrown," we know—

*"That in ourselves our safety must be sought;  
That by our own right hands it must be wrought."*

How blind we were this one short year ago! We had elected to keep out of the war. "All the while," said the President in his second inaugural address, "we have been conscious that we were not part of it," and, even though

we should "be drawn on, by circumstances, to a more active assertion of our rights and a more immediate association with the great struggle itself," the "shadows that now lie dark upon our path will soon be dispelled and we shall walk with the light all about us if we be but true to ourselves." As late as February 26, he had "thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms" and on April 2 he felt that assurance had been added "to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening" happenings in Russia. War there needs must be, but it shall be an academic war and soon ended—this was the great illusion pressed, with utmost good faith, no doubt, for months and months, by the President and his associates upon the minds of the people. We say it in no captious spirit but we say it,—as a fact which has been attended by consequences whose continuance and repetition must be averted in the future if the world is to be saved.

We have been at war a year, come April 6—technically and confessedly, though Germany had been waging war against us for many months before. What have we accomplished in that year?

In the first place, we have suffered disillusionment. We have indeed suffered that in several respects. One relates to our prestige and authority in the world. There were those—*Ilium fuit!*—who thought, or who thought that they thought, that no nation in the world would dare to stand up against us. Let the United States so much as threaten to take a hand, and the offending nation would incontinently drop its guns and raise the white flag of unconditional surrender. It may be that such was the case at some point in our history. What is certain is, that it was not the case in April, 1917. It may be that such might have been the case then, if we had acted differently during the few preceding years. But we had not acted differently. And so Germany refused to be scared at the prospect of having to fight us in addition to the other Allies. On the contrary, she regarded our advent among the belligerents with at least an affectation of unconcern if not of contempt.

Now it may be that Germany made a mistake in so doing; just as she did when she spoke so slightly of "Britain's contemptible little army." We rather think that before the end is reached the Huns will find that it was a very serious thing

to them for America to enter the war. Yet now, as the net result of the first year of our participation, what is there to show that Germany underrated us or that we deserved the prestige which the event proved we had not?

In another respect we have suffered disillusionment. This year has demonstrated that despite the President's ill-advised protestation that "we have not been neglectful" all that was said about our unpreparedness and about the urgent need of preparation, was true, and not only true but most tremendously timely and pertinent. It is officially confessed that we were grossly and grotesquely unprepared; and that even in the tense weeks between our severance of relations with Germany and the actual declaration of war, when it was obvious that the chances were a thousand to one that we should very soon be at war, even then there was scarcely a single prudent and resolute step taken toward preparation.

Indeed, after the declaration of war lack of preparation continued to prevail. Money in plenty was provided, and the Administration was invested with such power as never was exercised before save by a dictator or a czar. But it was months before any adequate army began to be raised and months more before it was equipped with the necessities; and it was months before there was any real beginning of ship-building; though of course it was obvious to everybody from the very beginning that men and ships were the very Alpha and Omega of our war needs. Utter unpreparedness before the war began, and sluggishness in making amends for that neglect after it began; these were the two circumstances which should have yanked us out of our fool's paradise of dreams of formidable invincibility.

Nor can we escape the conviction that this first year of our war has been less effective than it should have been, because of a certain irresolution—shall we say, an inclination toward "watchful waiting"?—in what should have been the supreme and unwavering leadership of the nation. We would not for a moment minimize the tremendous burden of care and responsibility which rested upon the President, nor would we demand that every man shall have infallible vision and a conviction of the end from the beginning. But we must believe that far more would have been achieved during our first year of war, and that consequently the cost of the whole war to us in treasure and in lives would have been greatly lessened, if there had been a greater degree of con-

stancy in policy, and less inclination toward dalliance with an optimistic opportunism.

It is easy to understand the President's passionate yearning for peace. We all share it. There is no American worthy of the name who would not rejoice at the making of peace to-morrow, provided it was a clean, honorable, just and righteous peace, and not the peace of the Hun. But it surely is evident now that our various excursions toward peace by negotiation were, from the very beginning, as vain and futile as the chasing of a rainbow for its hidden pot of gold. Such adventures did not bring peace; they postponed it. They did not embarrass the foe nor unite and strengthen our friends, but just the opposite. Our tentative overtures or at least suggestions of peace simply played into the hands of Germany and strengthened her, while they gave encouragement and aid to the propagation of disloyalty on the Italian front and of Bolshevism throughout Russia. When the war-weary troops saw month after month pass without the striking of a single blow by the United States in the war, and when they learned that this country was apparently seeking a "peace without victory" through negotiation instead of fighting, what wonder that they lost heart?

This is of course not to say that there has been nothing good in our policy. There has been much that was worthy of all praise. No commendation could be too high for the President's war message of a year ago; nor for his statement of our war aims and purposes of January 8 last. Those utterances were vibrant with the true spirit of American democracy. They were so supremely fine that it was a thousand pities to have them in the least degree compromised or modified by any subsequent temporizing, explaining, or pussy-footing. It seemed at times as though the President were afraid of himself; afraid, that is, that he had gone too far and shown himself too resolute, wherefore he reckoned it prudent to hedge somewhat. And this was all the more regrettable because in no case had the nation failed to follow his leadership in his most advanced declarations. In all his distinguished career Mr. Wilson has never made two other addresses which have so instantly, spontaneously and all but universally commanded enthusiastic popular approval and support, as did those epochal messages of April 2, 1917, and January 8, 1918. Why was it necessary—if we may employ the paradox—to detract from them by adding to them?

Our efficiency in the first year of war has been impaired, too, by what we may perhaps describe as a romantic humanitarianism. Our gingerly tenderness in dealing with alien spies and domestic traitors has been such as the world has never known before, and such as would be incredible and impossible in any other nation. Long after the declaration of war, enemy aliens were as free to go and come, to see and to hear, as were our own most loyal citizens. Even after the adult males of the tribe were subjected to some slight degree of surveillance and restraint, "the female of the species" remained as free as ever. And to this day the allies of our foes are practically unrestrained. We can understand a man being a pacifist, unwilling to sanction the imposition of capital punishment upon a traitor or a spy; but we cannot understand such a man's being made and kept Secretary of War. Would a man who was particularly fond of omelettes employ as cook one who had conscientious scruples against the breaking of eggs?

We have been unpleasantly reminded, too, that in sordidness and self-seeking Americans are "as common mortals." We shall not say that profiteering and frauds are more prevalent in this war than in others, but we certainly cannot say that they are less so. We should have to go far in history before we found a more flagrant example of—well, of questionable propriety—than that of the giving of army contracts to the brother of the Secretary of War and the bolstering up of the job with the use of statements fittingly to be described with Our Colonel's "shorter and uglier word." From that example very close to the head, down through the various grades there has been a disgusting display of sordid zeal to make money out of the nation's needs. It was discreditable before our year of war to seek extortionate profits in war trade with other lands. To do so now that we ourselves are in the war, in trade with our own Government, is discreditable to the degree of abomination.

We should hesitate to decide off hand whether another feature of our first year of war should be attributed to indifference or to panic. We refer to the little short of reckless delegation and redelegation of authority and granting of power and money. Beyond question, all money and all power and authority that are needed for the expeditious and inexorable prosecution of the war to a victorious ending should be granted without grudging and without delay.

But such grants can be made without signing blank checks. It may be that everything that has been done has been entirely necessary and is capable of complete justification and was inspired by eternal wisdom; only, it would be ever so much better to have the people persuaded of the fact instead of asking them to take it on blind faith. "Open your mouth and shut your eyes and I'll give you something to make you wise" may be a very good game of childhood, but it is not to be commended to a great nation involved in a great war.

That we have made some progress in military preparation is of course not to be disputed. We have enrolled an army, large in comparison with what it was before, though still small in comparison with what it will have to be to win the war. We have also now, at the end of a year, begun to equip it with the necessities of warfare. We have a force on the fighting line, quite competent, with the use of borrowed equipment, to hold a sector of that line and of course to give a good account of itself. We have also, after months of Denmanism, begun to build ships, with a prospect that if there are no more strikes, and the weather is favorable, and nobody puts moth-balls in the gasoline tank, we may turn out this year nearly half as much tonnage as the German U-boats destroy, and a quarter as much as was promised earlier in the year.

What the year has brought forth in the camps of our enemies is a different story, and one which it is still less pleasant to contemplate. It would be folly to dispute that Germany has immensely improved and strengthened her position, from both the military and the diplomatic point of view. On the western front, indeed, she has been held back, and at some points has been forced further back; though nowhere between the Alps and the North Sea has there been anything resembling a decision. Everywhere else she has been gaining ground. She has driven the Italians out of Austria and has in turn invaded Italy. She has suppressed all hostile action in the Balkans. She has conquered Roumania and made that rich country her vassal. She has conquered Russia, annexed all its western provinces and made a subservient vassal of the southern provinces from Poland to the Caucasus. She has occupied and practically annexed Finland, and gone far toward making vassals of all the Scandinavian kingdoms. She has secured for her ally the Unspeakable Turk, all of Russian Armenia and

Transcaucasia, and thus has opened her way to Persia, to Afghanistan and to the borders of British India. She has also gained a strong and advanced foothold in Siberia, with a threat of advancing across the continent to the Pacific coast.

In making these territorial gains Germany has enormously replenished her supplies for both military and civil consumption. She has gained access to the chief granaries of Europe and Asia; to the richest oil fields in the world; to vast cotton plantations in Central Asia; to inexhaustible mines of copper and platinum; to the most extensive forests in the world. She has also nearly doubled her population by the addition of great subject peoples, who will immensely increase her man-power for both military and industrial purposes. Her dream of "Mitteleuropa" is not only realized but is expanded into an Eurasian realm.

At the same time she has shown herself impregnable at home. The year has been filled with wild and whirling words about driving a wedge between the German people and their military rulers, and about a German revolution against the Hohenzollerns. They have been as idle as they have been wild. The wedge has not been driven. The people have not revolted. With the scarcity of supplies measurably relieved, and with the stimulus of victory all along the eastern line, the German people are to-day more united, more devoted to the House of Hohenzollern, and more determined to prosecute the war to a successful German peace, than they have ever been before since the war began.

Such are some of the chief results of the first year of our participation in the war. They are not gratifying nor flattering to contemplate. But they must be faced.

Happily, there is something else to be said. In spite of all these things the spirit of this nation and of its allies is unbroken. Never were Great Britain and France and Italy more resolute than they are to-day. They are disappointed at our inefficiency and delay, but that means to them simply that they have got to hold out so much the longer before our aid becomes effective. They have no thought of weakening, and they would not have even though they were left to fight the battle out alone. Equally resolute is the spirit of a saving remnant of our own nation. For we are not all asleep, we are not all profiteers, we are not all rainbow chasers, we are not all infected with the poison of lafollettism. In spite of all our blunderings and delay, there are in this country mil-



lions of quiet, resolute, clear-headed and red-blooded men, who believe in victory over the Hun as they believe in God Himself. They realize the awful cost, the needless cost, not only in treasure but also in human lives, that our follies have imposed upon us, and while they condemn the needlessness of it they unhesitatingly and steadfastly assume the burden and will bear it to the end.

The iridescent dream of victory in the first year has faded, and that of victory in the second year is fading. Whether the third or the thirty-third year be necessary, however, of this be sure, that we shall fight it out to a clean-cut victory for God and man over the Devil and the Hun.

But there must be no more wavering, no more palaver-ing, no more shaking of the faith of our Allies through "re-stating" greatly modified war aims; there is nothing in the world to do but to fight on and on in what now has come to be a *war of endurance* upon substantially equal terms.

VICTORY—PEACE—*Justice!* That is all.

## WHEREIN WASHINGTON FAILS

WE spent the month of February in Washington, and found opinion as to the merits of our performance in the War about equally divided between those who contemplate with satisfaction what has been done well and those who express their anger at what has been done badly. This division is, of course, temperamental, so far as it does not represent a tacit pledge of loyalty to the political "ins" or to the political "outs." What is extremely curious is that each opinion is the child of Surprise. Those whose thumbs are up for the Administration say that, in view of the novelty and magnitude of the task, of the extreme haste demanded by the circumstances, of our mental and material unpreparedness, our achievement has been surpassingly good. Those whose thumbs are down voice their amazement that in a country which has more coal, more iron, more lumber, more railroad mileage, more food products, more machinery, more great industrial organizations, and, by general acclamation, more business genius than any other nation, it should not have been possible to introduce into the conduct of the war more order and efficiency.

When we examined the actual conditions under which our part in the War is being directed from Washington the only circumstance which surprised us was that anyone could be surprised at what has occurred.

We found in Washington plenty of patriotism, plenty of ability, plenty of enthusiasm, plenty of industry; what was almost entirely lacking was a clear understanding of the principles of administrative technique, or, upon a more sinister interpretation of the facts, a general unwillingness to apply them. It is only by one or the other of these explanations that we can account for those shortcomings which, with unlimited means and unlimited ability at the disposal of the Government, are the unmistakable symptoms of defective organization.

There is one branch of the national service which, since we entered the War, has been almost entirely exempt from criticism—the Navy; and if we trace to its source the efficiency by which it has so greatly distinguished and contradistinguished itself we shall find the ultimate cause of the unsatisfactory results of the efforts made in other spheres of duty by men not less talented, not less patriotic, not less industrious than are those who make up the Naval personnel.

Naval efficiency is the product of two elements in naval organization. One is the unbroken chain of responsibility which links the Secretary of the Navy to the youngest seaman on a submarine-chaser. There is not in the Navy a carelessly worded document, an inaccurate coal report, or an unholed bearing in regard to which it is not possible to name one particular man as the person at fault; and this ability to place blame exactly where it belongs extends from a defective rivet in a bulkhead to a strategic error in an engagement at sea.

But this delicacy of functional articulation would be worse than useless were it not for another element with which it is closely co-ordinated, namely the extreme definiteness with which naval purposes and naval methods are formulated.

Those who have devoted any thought to the general problems of administration are familiar with the claim, so often advanced, that naval organization cannot be taken as a model, because the conditions to which it is adjusted are radically different from those which other enterprises are called upon to meet. It is, we are told, a technical service,

it is always on a war-footing, constant efficiency is imposed upon it by the nature of its operations and is maintained by a discipline from which there is no appeal.

Whatever force may lie in these arguments when they are employed during peace times to excuse a failure to do things "navy fashion," they have no force whatever when we are at war. "Navy fashion" is not too good, and nothing short of it is good enough, when the price of every inefficient act must be paid in human suffering and in human life.

The plain fact is that Washington is not yet on a war footing. We do not say that no part of it is on a war footing, what we assert is that so large a proportion of our total war effort is being directed in a spirit of earnest, good-natured amateurism that we are denied the full benefit which we ought to receive from the portion which is being directed with skill, foresight, and promptitude. There are altogether too many people in Washington who are redoubling their efforts after they have forgotten what their aim is.

What we saw, what we heard, what we read satisfied us that Washington has, up to the present, acted without adequate prevision of needs, without adequate information, without adequate definition of authority, without adequate co-ordination of effort, without adequate fixation of responsibility, without adequate inspection and report on methods and results.

The delay and confusion, the errors of commission and of omission, to which public attention has been directed by Congress and by the press can be attributed to one or another of these inadequacies, to several of them operating in malign association, or to personal incompetence among the agents of the Government. If it could be shown that the last named cause had played an important part in our failure fully to utilize the resources of the nation, the guilt would rest squarely upon the shoulders of the Administration, which is free to draw at will upon the experience and intelligence of the country. We believe that it has had a share, but not a large share, in making conditions what they are.

Of the other causes we may say that if each is in turn applied to any set of Administrative circumstances, failure, where it has occurred, can be traced to its general source, and thence, by a process of elimination, to a particular group or individual.

This fixing of responsibility is the cardinal principle of successful administration, since it opens the road to all betterment; but it avails nothing if the road remains untrodden. If consideration for persons or for customs is to arrest the hand of reform, if nobody's feelings are to be hurt, if no one is to lose his position, if punishment is not to follow neglect or reward attend upon competence, if constructive criticism is to be branded as disloyalty, if inquiry is to be met with unnecessary secrecy or with fussy resentment, then the effort to improve administrative methods in the interest of economy and efficiency is foredoomed to failure.

There is little evidence to be found in Washington that we are to have more than a piecemeal adjustment of our Government mechanism to the pressing needs of War. That there is actually a science of administrative technique, that we are confronted with few problems which have not at some time in some country been the subject of study and report, that every executive task, irrespective of its magnitude, is embraced within the formula of an administrative logic, Washington appears to be totally unconscious.

This inability to appreciate the true nature of the executive element in Government is fundamental to our institutions. It arises from our national habit of regarding administration as the twin brother of politics. We have placed ourselves between these two figures and, through trying for a century and a half to keep one eye fixed on each, we have acquired that governmental squint which makes it impossible for us to see right in front of us the area of confused aim and conflicting interest which is the breeding ground of political corruption and administrative inefficiency.

Nothing is more urgently required at this moment than a thorough re-examination of the whole machinery of our Government in the light of what has happened since 1787.

Our succeeding generations have seen Government pass from the simple duties imposed upon it by the needs of a primitive community to an all-embracing activity which concerns itself with the child at the mother's breast, with the corpse awaiting its shroud, and with almost every circumstance which lies between these two estates of humanity. We have been content to believe that, in some mysterious way, a system designed to perform little more than the functions of the tax-collector and the policeman would bear the strain of regulating, by means of good-will and a huge

clerical staff, the immeasurable complexities of modern life. It is time that we emancipated ourselves from this delusion.

## LABOR AND THE WAR

WHERE stands Labor in the war? The question should not be necessary. We ask it under protest, holding that in such a matter no classes should be recognized but the nation should be united. The Bolsheviki may preach the devil's doctrine of class wars, and proclaim it to be the first duty of workmen to fight against those whom they call the bourgeoisie. We prefer the American doctrine of community of interest between employer and employes, between capital and labor, and among all members of the Commonwealth.

The question is raised, however. The Bolsheviki, the lafollette, the Pacifists, the I Won't Work and other wearers of mental motley pretend that the war was started and is being prosecuted by wicked capitalists for their own sordid sakes, and against the will and the interests of the "proletariat"; wherefore they are in favor of inciting the "proletariat" of all nations to go on universal strike against the war, and to compel immediate peace by negotiation, after the fashion of Brest-Litovsk.

What then are the facts concerning the attitude of Labor, or of workingmen, toward the war?

We suppose that there are no two other important countries of the world, not excepting the United States, in which Organized Labor is so influential, both subjectively and objectively, as in Great Britain and France. In them it has accomplished ten times as much for the dignity and the welfare of workingmen as have the far more noisy and pretentious Social Democrats of Germany. We may therefore take its dicta as the mind of the world's industrialists in their greatest social and political advancement, and in their best estate.

There was recently held in London an international conference of representatives of the workingmen, or of the organized labor and the political labor parties, of those countries, the chief purpose of which was to consider the war, and what should be the policy of Labor toward it and toward the prospective terms of peace; and it adopted a detailed declaration of principles and a programme of action, for the guid-

ance of its constituents, and for communication to the organized labor of all other countries, particularly including the Central Powers.

The first item of this instrument was significant. It was a clean-cut and unequivocal declaration in favor of fighting the war out to a victorious finish in order that the world may be made safe for civilization. That was the fundamental purpose of the Conference in supporting the continuance of the war. No matter who won the war, the people would have lost unless that end was assured. There followed a demand for a League of Nations to enforce peace, which is the proposal of many of the most resolute supporters of the war in this country, and which may indeed be regarded as primarily an American principle; the abolition of secret diplomacy and the publication of all treaties, according to the American practice; and the making of all Executives, and especially all Foreign Ministers, responsible to popular Legislatures, as they are in Great Britain and France, and as not a few think they would better be in the United States. The abolition of compulsory military service and the limitation of armaments are also demanded, but it is made clear that they are not to be undertaken until after the ending of the war.

The next item has to do with Belgium. The Conference emphatically insists that a foremost condition of peace must be Germany's reparation of her wrongs to Belgium, including payment not by all the Powers but by Germany alone for all the damage that has been done to Belgium in the war, and of course complete restoration of Belgian independence. Until Germany is willing to do that, say the workingmen of those two great industrial countries, the war must be inexorably prosecuted.

The question of Alsace and Lorraine follows, and the Conference insists as a matter of abstract right that if the people of those provinces wish it, they must be reunited with France, and thus must be annulled that crime of 1871 which the Conference characterizes as "a brutal conquest, and violence committed against the people."

Concerning the Balkans, they must be evacuated by the invaders, and the various peoples must be permitted to settle their own destinies "without regard to the imperialist pretensions of Austria, Hungary, Turkey, or any other state." That means, of course, the restoration of Bosnia and Herze-

govina to Serbia, the freeing of Croatia and Slavonia, and the cession of Transylvania to Roumania.

As for Italy, she must have Italia Irredenta restored to her, though there must be no conquests beyond that limit.

Poland must be reconstituted in unity and independence, with free access to the sea. Therefore Prussia and Austria must surrender Posen and Silesia and Galicia, and Dantzic must be again a Polish seaport. As for German annexation, open or disguised, of Lithuania, Livonia or Courland, that "would be a flagrant and wholly inadmissible violation of international law." Since the Conference adopted that declaration, Germany has in fact annexed all three of those provinces, wherefore the proletariat of Great Britain and France are resolved to prosecute the war until that act is undone.

For the Jews, there should be established for them a free state in Palestine, under international guarantee, such as Great Britain has already promised. Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia must not be put back under Turkish tyranny—as Germany has since done with Armenia. Austria-Hungary is not necessarily to be dismembered, but if the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks want to be free and independent, they should have that right. Finally, the African and other colonies are to be disposed of after due deliberation by the peace conference, in which "the communities in their neighborhood will be entitled to take part."

Such are the deliberate judgments of the freely chosen representatives of the millions of industrialists of Great Britain and France. They accord closely with the views already expressed by Mr. Gompers and other authoritative American labor leaders. They demonstrate unerringly the substantial unity of all so-called classes in these three countries, concerning the prosecution of the war and the essential terms of peace. Organized labor and the national governments are in complete accord.

We insist, then, that these declarations are supremely entitled to be regarded as the real voice of the world's workmen. We know of no reason why the words of a German workingman, with the fear of *lèse-majesté* before him and with a Boche bayonet potentially at his throat, should be esteemed as more authentic than that of an Englishman, a Frenchman or an American. We have never heard of any degree of enlightenment and advancement in Russia beyond

the rest of the world that should entitle Bolshevik opinions to outrank American, British or French.

So when we say that the war must be fought to a victorious finish that will make the world safe for democracy, that Germany must relinquish Belgium and pay full indemnity for all the damage which the war has done to that country, that Alsace and Lorraine must be returned to France, that the partition of Poland must be undone and the independent Polish nation must be re-established, that Serbia must have her lost provinces returned to her, that Italia Irredenta must be redeemed, and that British South Africa and Australia must have a voice concerning the disposition of the German colonies adjacent to them—when we say such things, we are speaking not for “imperialists” or “bourgeoisie”, whatever those terms may mean in a land where they do not belong, but for Labor, for the proletariat, as our European friends are fond of calling it, or, best of all, for the people.

The fact is that more than almost any other war that ever was waged, this is the people's war. Never were the rights and welfare of the people—the non-combatant people—so shamefully violated as they have been in this war. Never have the people been so infamously wronged, robbed, ravished, tortured, murdered. Never have the fundamental principles of popular rights and popular government been so insolently defied, denied and threatened with extinction. It is and it has from the beginning been a war waged against the people by an autocratic military caste, and it is high time for all the people of the world to recognize that fact and to act upon it, as those of the three chief Allied nations have done.

Let there be no more question as to where the people stand, or where labor stands, in this war. They stand for an inexorable prosecution of the war until the archfoe of popular government and the rights of man is eliminated from the councils of the world.

## THE JAP OR THE HUN?

The Jap, or the Hun? Which?

If in form the question seems somewhat reminiscent of Frank Stockton's immortal *The Lady, or the Tiger?* we



apologize to the tiger for putting him in apposition with the Hun. Not even the mangiest man-eater that ever prowled the jungle is quite deserving of such a fate.

But whatever comes of the existing complications in Russia, and for present consideration especially in the Asian portions of that empire, one thing is clear: Immediately upon the collapse of efficient government at Petrograd, with the accompanying danger of German domination,—a danger which is now made real, to the incalculable cost of the world,—the coöperation of Japan with the Allies, of which indeed she is one, should have been made effective. With the unanimous approval of the Allied Powers, and with or without their nominal participation, which could easily have been given, Japan should have taken possession not merely of Vladivostok and all the Siberian Pacific littoral, but also of the trans-Siberian Railway and of Siberia itself, as far westward as possible or as seemed desirable. If it were possible for her to push her way clear across the Continent, into European Russia, to Moscow and to Petrograd, so much the better.

And in approving and promoting that movement, the United States of America, instead of hanging back and pussy-footing, should have taken the instantaneous and unreserved initiative.

Such a course on the part of Japan and the Powers would have been impregnably justifiable, from whatever point of view it might be regarded.

Precedents assuredly are not lacking. One of the most recent was the international intervention in China at the time of the Boxer insurrection. No power has challenged the propriety or the legality of it, judged on the broad basis of international equity. Yet so far as general international interests were concerned, there was not a tithe of the need and the justification for it that there now is for intervention in Russia. Another precedent was established by the European Powers in 1878, when they provided for Austrian intervention in and temporary occupation of the Serbian provinces of the Turkish Empire; a precedent which was not vitiated by Austria's monstrous and criminal breach of faith in stealing that which was assigned to her to hold in trust. We may be sure that no such infamy would mark Japan's occupation of Siberia. A third precedent, if memory serves us aright, was provided in Russia's occupation of

the Kuldja Province; in which case, the Bolsheviki not then being in power, Russia kept faith and duly restored the region to its rightful owner when the beneficent purpose of the intervention had been achieved.

From the Russian point of view, such action by Japan would be approved and welcomed by men of integrity and reason. Traitors and highbinders, like Lenin and Trotzky and their kidney, would doubtless rage against it, because there was "nothing in it" for themselves. But men like Prince Lvoff and the others who really effected the revolution against Czarism, would welcome it as assuring the salvation of Russian democracy. Obviously, there is no ground on which valid Russian objection could be made. There would be no infringement upon Russian sovereignty, because it no longer exists. Russian sovereignty lapsed, was abrogated, ceased to exist, when the Bolshevik coup d'état destroyed the Constituent Assembly and surrendered to the Huns. In that catastrophe Russia became an anarchy, and it became not only the right but also the duty of some civilized Power to intervene, for Russia's sake as well as its own and that of the world at large.

We are staunch sticklers for the right of national self-determination. But we do not maintain the right of any nation to raise hell to the peril and detriment of its neighbors.

From the point of view of the European Allies there was and is imperative need of such a course. The German invasion of Asia is the gravest menace to them since the Marne. The German Government is already boasting that its road is now open to Persia and Afghanistan, and through them, of course, to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and to the borders of British India. It is also quite evident that the Bolshevik betrayal comprised the surrender of Siberia to the hordes of German prisoners of war who were in that country and who were released from confinement as a result of the treason of Brest-Litovsk. Would such an incursion of the Huns, with the appearance of Hunnish U-boats and cruisers in the Indian and Pacific oceans, be a matter of indifference to the Powers? How is it to be guarded against unless by a Japanese advance through Siberia, which would block the Huns' raids in that direction and which, if carried far enough, either into European Russia or into Turkestan, would make it too perilous for Germany to attempt to reach India or the Persian Gulf.

Such a campaign would place Germany again between the "jaws of the nutcracker," with Japan taking Russia's place as the eastern jaw.

There remains to be considered the point of view of the United States; assuming for sake of argument that this country has or ought to have a point of view separate from that of its Allies.

Beyond question, American precedents are overwhelmingly in favor of such a course. Apart from our participation in the Chinese intervention, already recalled, we have been doing that sort of thing on our own account, all the way through our history. We began it a hundred years ago, in our intervention in Florida. We did it a generation ago in Samoa. We did it twice in Cuba, with most excellent results. Only a few years ago, in President Wilson's first term, we did it in Mexico. We can perceive no ground on which we could logically and equitably object to Japan's following the example which we ourselves have set.

Can we not trust Japan? We are not unfamiliar with diplomatic history, but we cannot remember nor can we by searching find a case in which Japan has regarded a treaty as a "scrap of paper," or in which she has not loyally fulfilled her obligations. If there have been any apparent evasions of treaty stipulations, they have been on our side rather than on hers. We recently made with her a "gentlemen's agreement" on a very important matter. Surely it would be an extraordinary thing to enter into such relations with a nation which we could not trust. Incidentally we might remark that we do not think very highly of such agreements, which seem to us merely a trick for making a treaty which need not be submitted to the Senate. That savors too much of the "secret diplomacy" which when practiced by others we have been so copiously condemning. But there can be no question that the making of one logically implies a high degree of mutual confidence between the two Powers.

But if we could not trust Japan, if we feared that she would make her occupation of Siberia permanent, and if we feared her hostility toward us, what would be the logic of the case? Why, beyond question, for those very reasons we should assent joyfully to the invasion of Siberia, because it would be turning the peril away from our own shores. We have a pretty high opinion of Japanese efficiency, but we really do not believe that that country would be capable of

invading, annexing and assimilating Siberia, and then at the same time or a little later invading, annexing and assimilating the United States. If we were afraid of Japan, the shrewdest thing we could possibly do to protect ourselves would be to send her off on this Siberian enterprise.

Of course, however, we are not afraid of Japan, and we do not distrust her. She had her chance to be unfriendly toward us early in the war, when Germany did her level best to persuade Japan to join her and Mexico in a war of conquest against us. Japan rejected the proposal with unhesitating emphasis and with unconcealed contempt. All through the war she has refrained from seeking to take any advantage of us, and has manifested a loyal friendship above all praise. To our mind it is high time that we showed our appreciation of her friendship and our reliance upon her good faith.

There is, we know, no little prejudice against Japan in the United States. That simply means that there is a lot of German propaganda. Mr. Lansing, our Secretary of State, declares that the suspicion, constraint and doubt which have to some extent arisen between the two countries, were "fostered and encouraged by the campaign of falsehood adroitly and secretly carried on by Germans whose government, as a part of its foreign policy, desired especially to alienate this country and Japan." Mr. Root, formerly Secretary of State, says that he has not the slightest doubt that "the attempts to create bad feeling between the United States and Japan have been very largely the result of a fixed and settled purpose, and that purpose formed a part of the policy of that great ruling caste of Germany which is attempting to subjugate the world." Mr. Gerard, lately our Ambassador at Berlin, says that tales of Japanese hostility to the United States emanated from German sources, and he suggests that "much of the prejudice in America against the Japanese was cooked up by German propagandists."

Would it not be an astounding anomaly if in the present tremendous crisis this country permitted this same pernicious German propaganda to alienate it from Japan and to deprive us of the coöperation of that country in a matter which may involve the very existence of America? We all know that the tales of Japan's acquisition of Magdalena Bay, of Japanese troops in Mexico, of Japanese boats secretly taking soundings in our harbors, of a Japanese plot to destroy the Panama

Canal, of Japanese designs against the Philippines, were all deliberate, baseless and wanton lies, invented by German propagandists with malice aforethought. The animosity and distrust which are now manifested toward Japan may safely be set down as the more or less direct result of that same infernal propaganda.

How, therefore, shall we answer the question concerning the temporary control of Siberia and perhaps of all that is left of Russia herself?

The Jap, or the Hun?

As for us, we prefer Japanese loyalty to German treachery. We prefer Japanese cleanliness to German filth. We prefer Japanese who keep treaties to Germans who treat them as mere "scraps of paper." We prefer Japanese civilization to Hunnish barbarism.

The Jap, or the Hun?

In Heaven's name, the Jap!

## PRICES AND PRODUCTION—A CONTRAST

LET us not get "the big head." It is unpleasant to be a kill-joy, but it is unwise to cherish a fool's paradise. The statistics of our industries and commerce for the last year are so colossal, from the most obvious point of view, as to suggest danger of a mischievously exaggerated estimate of our progress in the minds of those who—and it is to be feared that they constitute the great majority—take only that point of view and quite neglect to consider others which are really much more significant but which the imperfections of our statistical service render less accessible.

There is something tremendous, something dazzling to the imagination, in the current reports of our foreign commerce for 1917. It amounted, we are told, to \$9,178,000,000; of which \$6,226,000,000 were exports and \$2,952,000,000 were imports; leaving a balance in our favor of \$3,274,000,000. Thus the balance in our favor was considerably more than the total of imports, and was about equal to the entire value of our trade, both exports and imports, ten years ago. Those figures, we repeat, are tremendous. They impress the mind as do the measurements of the interstellar spaces. They are too great for ordinary comprehension. Taken at their face value, without ex-

planation, they would convey the impression of commercial—and therefore of industrial—progress made by the proverbial “leaps and bounds,” and of an attained greatness quite overshadowing all else in the economic history of the world.

It would be a mischievous mistake, however, thus to take these figures. They are, it is true, entirely accurate; and we are prone to rely upon the foolish saying that “figures don’t lie.” The fact is, of course, as Carlyle said, that “you can prove anything by figures.” There is nothing more misleading than accurate statistics which give only a partial view of the facts. The error in this case would lie in confounding values with volumes, and in assuming that these figures represent so much actual increase in the extent and amount of our trade. There has been some increase in the latter; in some details a very large increase. But it has not been nearly sufficient to account for the enormous increase in the value of our commerce which we have cited.

The pernicious imperfection of our statistics as commonly published is in their omission of quantities. They tell us what was the total value of our exports. Perhaps they go a little further into details and tell us what was the value of the steel, and of the wheat and of the cotton which we sent to other lands. That is all true, and all interesting. But they do not tell us how many tons of steel, and bushels of wheat, and bales of cotton, we sent; although it is perfectly apparent, on reflection, that these latter figures would be most important of all, as signifying the real increase—or decrease—of our trade.

We shall find, upon analysis, therefore, that the great increase in the value of our commerce, which is reported and upon which we dwell with so much exultation, is by no means altogether due to a commensurate increase in the volume of our exports, but very largely to an increase in the prices of commodities. Between 1910 and 1917 there was an increase of about 233 per cent in the total value of our exports. But at the same time there was an increase of 200 per cent in the price of pig iron, of more than 100 in steel billets, of 100 in copper, of 100 in cotton, of 135 in wheat, of 84 in beef, of 100 in pork, and so on through the whole list of commodities. It was not that we were selling so much more, but that we were getting so much more for what we sold.

The same considerations apply to the current statistics of our agricultural products, which we have been exploiting into one of the wonders of the world. It is made known, doubtless with accuracy, that in 1917 the total value of those products reached the almost incomprehensible total of \$19,443,849,381. In 1910 it was only \$9,037,390,744; so that in seven years there was an increase of 115 per cent; whereat the superficial observer might exclaim upon the stupendous progress which our agricultural industries have made.

The fallacy in any such view is to be perceived through making a comparison not merely of the total values but of the quantities and prices of our chief agricultural products in 1917 with those of preceding years. Let us take for this purpose the five years from 1911 to 1915 inclusive, the five years immediately preceding the material influence of the war upon our agricultural economics; reckoning the average total values, amount of production, and price rates, of those years.

The first of our crops in importance is corn. Its total value in the five years 1911-1915 averaged \$1,644,511,000, and in 1917 it was \$4,053,672,000; an increase of more than 140 per cent. Enormous! But "season your admiration for a while." There was in the same period, it is true, a certain increase in actual production. That was from 2,754,164,000 bushels to 3,159,494,000 bushels, or something more than 14 per cent. Thus the increase in production was only one-tenth as great as the increase in value. The difference is of course explained by the fact that the price per bushel rose from 59.7 cents to \$1.283, or nearly 115 per cent. It was to the increase in price far more than to the increase in quantity that the increase in the value of the crop was due.

Our second crop is cotton. Its total value increased in the period under consideration from \$709,629,000 to \$1,517,558,000, or nearly 114 per cent. Splendid, indeed! But if we look a little further we find that the quantity produced did not increase at all, but actually decreased from 14,175,872 to 10,949,000 bales; due, as might be supposed, to a corresponding decrease in the number of acres planted and in the number of pounds grown on each acre. The decrease in production was thus nearly 22.7 per cent, but at the same time the price rose from 10 cents to 27.7 cents,

an increase of 177 per cent, and that was what caused the increase in the total value of the crop.

Third, wheat; the crop in which there is perhaps the chief interest, as of greatest international importance. The increase in the value of the crop has been from \$705,890,000 to \$1,307,418,000, or more than 85 per cent. But as in the case of cotton, there was not an increase but a considerable decrease in the quantity produced, due to a decrease both of the number of acres planted and the number of bushels obtained from each acre. The decrease in total quantity was from 806,361,000 bushels to 650,828,000 bushels, or more than 19 per cent. But of course there was a great increase in the price per bushel, from 87.9 cents to \$2.009, or more than 129 per cent. That was why the total value of the crop so greatly increased.

Take a fourth crop, potatoes. Its value increased from \$219,137,000 to \$543,865,000, or 148 per cent. There was also an increase in production, from 362,910,000 bushels to 442,536,000 bushels, or 22 per cent; due to increase both of acres planted and of bushels obtained from each acre. Yet it is obvious that the increase of 148 per cent in value was due not so much to the increase of 22 per cent in production as to the increase of more than 103 per cent in price, from 60.4 cents to \$1.229 a bushel. The same circumstance is still more forcibly illustrated in a comparison of the potato crop of 1916 with the average of the five immediately preceding years. There was an increase of more than 91 per cent on total value of the crop, while there was not an increase but an actual decrease in quantity of 21 per cent, but an increase of nearly 142 per cent in price.

These facts and figures demonstrate, then, that we are not so much enjoying expansion of commerce and growth of industries as we are experiencing—enjoying or suffering, as you please—expansion of prices. Between the two things there is a vast difference. The one is substantial, the other is unsubstantial. The increase of prices, or of so-called values, is artificial and will prove transitory. For this reason it is far more important that we should find a market for two bushels of wheat where we sold only one before, than that we should content ourselves with getting twice as much as formerly for the one bushel. It is far more important to grow two bushels where only one grew



before, than to double the price for the one bushel. Quantity is a fixed factor; price is fluctuating.

It is, no doubt, a fine thing to have so great a balance of trade in our favor. It enables us to be—and it imposes upon us the duty and the necessity of being—the financial backer of the Allied Nations. But that, after all, is a temporary matter, pertaining to only the period of duration of the war. The far more important questions are, to what extent we shall be able to hold permanently after the war whatever increase there has been in volume and distribution of our commerce, and to what extent the balance of trade will continue to be in our favor—after the special economic conditions of the war are ended and the war-time inflation of prices has collapsed.

It is a fine thing to say, no doubt, that the value of last year's corn crop was sufficient to pay four times over our national debt as it existed before the war. But there is a grim anomaly in the fact that while in 1917 the value of our crops was more than double what it was in 1910, we are now suffering from scarcity of food, though in that former year, with less than half the value, we had abundance. The explanation is of course obvious. There has been little if any increase in production, and there has been a considerable increase in the demand for exportation. But the lesson of it ought to be equally obvious; it ought, as the French say, to strike us in the face. It is the need, set forth months ago in the pages of this REVIEW, of agricultural mobilization and intensive farming.

What we need to do is to shut our eyes to the flattering and delusive figures of vast values through inflated prices, and to open them to those of meagre production. There is no use in talking about how many national debts the value of our corn crop would pay off, or how many automobiles or wrist watches the potato crop would buy. What we need to consider is how, right now in Anno Domini 1918, we are going to produce enough wheat and pork to feed our Allies who are saving our wives and daughters from being ravished by Hohenzollern Huns.